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RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, THEOLOGICAL 
ARGUMENT, AND THE RELEVANCE OF RHETORIC 
William J. Wainwright 
In this essay, I argue that (1) philosophical arguments play an integral role in 
certain styles of piety, but that, (2) to achieve their purpose, these arguments 
must be good ones. (3) Good reasoning about religious matters depends upon 
the state of one's heart, however, and, if so, (4) the western philosophical tradi-
tion is mistaken in sharply contrasting philosophy and rhetoric, and denigrat-
ing the latter. 
This essay is concerned with the bearing of religious experience in the 
broadest sense on religious argumentation, and the consequences that con-
nection has for our understanding of philosophy's relation to rhetoric. The 
experiences I have in mind include not only noetic religious experiences or 
perception-like experiences of the divine but also, and more importantly, 
ordinary devotional experiences and religiously salient motions of the 
heart (Pascal and Edwards) or of what William James called our passional 
nature--our temperament, religiously relevant needs, desires, concerns, 
fears, hopes, loves, hatreds, passions, emotions, and "divinations."! More 
generally, the relevant experiences embrace the religiously relevant por-
tions of our inward history in all their emotional, affective, and intellectual 
particularity, the individual way in which each of us experiences the 
world. In what follows I shall argue that (1) religiOUS experience in this 
broad sense provides the context within which religious argumentation 
takes place, that (2) religiously salient motions of the heart can be epistemi-
cally relevant, and that (3) once this is understood, philosophy must 
rethink its relation to rhetoric. 
I. 
In some well-known passages from the Pensees, Blaise Pascal asserts that, at 
best, "proofs only convince the mind." (252) They make "little impression" 
upon the heart. (542) A successful theistic proof might establish the exis-
tence of "a God considered as great, powerful, and eternal." It would not 
prove the existence of "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of 
Jacob." God is indeed great, powerful, and eternal. But He is also "a God 
of love and comfort...who fills the soul and heart of those whom He pos-
sesses." (555) This God's existence cannot be established by philosophical 
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proofs.' More than two centuries later, William James claimed that philo-
sophical proofs of God's existence, nature, and so on, "prove nothing rigor-
ously." At most, "they only corroborate our preexistent partialities." 
"Feeling is the deeper source of religion and ... philosophical and theological 
formulas are secondary products like translations of a text into another 
tongue."3 
Pascal and James express a widely held view. Philosophical proofs are, 
at best, religiously useless. At worst, they are inimical to the religious life. 
I shall argue that this is seriously mistaken. Proofs can be, and often are, 
integral parts of a religiously engaged life. 
Among the Madhyamikas, for example, philosophical argumentation is 
an essential part of spiritual discipline. Proofs are marshalled to demon-
strate the incoherence of the concepts used to structure sense impressions 
(such as the concept of cause or the concept of substance) and thereby 
reveal the emptiness (sunya) of things. For when conceptual thinking is 
abandoned, the suchness of things (tathata) is then revealed in a non-dual, 
non-conceptual intuition called "the perfection of wisdom (prajna parami-
ta)"-an insight into the nature of reality that frees us from the ignorance 
(avidya) and thirst (trisna) that bind us to samsara. 
I shall focus primarily on theism, however. How are theistic arguments 
used in practice? They are sometimes addressed to unbelievers. For exam-
ple, Anselm's Monologion is addressed to the "ignorant," and not only to 
his fellow monks. And Udayana's arguments are addressed to Buddhists 
as well as to devotees of Siva in his own Nyaya-vaisesika tradition: But 
theistic arguments are also used to establish common ground and to settle 
intramural disputes. 
Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles,. for instance, was partly directed 
toward Muslims who already believed in God's existence. In that context, 
the proofs of God's existence and attributes were designed to establish 
common ground which could then be used as a basis upon which to con-
struct specifically Christian arguments. Again, the Jesuit missionary 
Roberto de Nobili (1577-1656) used a version of Aquinas's five ways to 
establish common ground with (primarily theistic) Hindus.' 
Theistic proofs have also been used to settle disputes within a common 
tradition. Udayana's theistic proofs were not only directed against 
Buddhists. They were also addressed to Mimamsakas in his own Hindu 
tradition who offered an atheistic interpretation of the Vedas. Or consider 
al-Ghazali who employed a version of the Kalam cosmological argument" 
to show that the "philosophers" (preeminently Averroes' and Avicena's) 
interpretations of the Quran were heretical? 
More interesting than either of these uses is the employment of theistic 
arguments in a devotional context. The title of Udayana's 
Nyayakusumanjali can be (very roughly) translated as "a bouquet of argu-
ments offered to God." The work has three purposes-to convince unbe-
lievers, to strengthen the faithful, but also to please Siva "by my presenting it 
as an offering at his footstool." Apart from whatever success Udayana's 
arguments mayor may not have had in achieving his first two goals, they 
have value as a gift offered to God; their construction and presentation is 
an act of worship. 
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Or consider Anselm's Proslogion. As Marilyn Adams and others have 
argued, that the Proslogion is cast in the form of a prayer isn't accidentaP 
In the first place, the entire project is framed by a desire to "contemplate 
God," or "see God's face." The attempt to understand what one believes 
by finding reasons for it is a means to this end. Second, the inquiry as a 
whole is a divine-human collaboration in which Anselm prays for assis-
timce, and punctuates the course of his argument with praise and thanks-
giving for the light he has received. 
My contention, then, is that the practice of philosophical theology is an 
integral part of some styles of piety, some ways of living the religious life. 
Nor is this style of piety, or way of living the religious life, confined to a 
few religious intellectuals. Austin Warren has argued that Harriet Beecher 
Stowe's OldTown Folks and The Minister's Wooing "are the best [extant] 
recreations of [New England] theocracy's last days."9 Consider, then, her 
description of the latter's heroine, Mary: "Had she been born in Italy, 
under the dissolving influences of that sunny dreamy clime, beneath the 
shadow of cathedrals, and where pictured saints and angels smiled in 
clouds of painting from every arch and altar, she might like fair St. 
Catherine of Siena, have seen beatific visions in the sunset skies and a sil-
ver dove descending upon her as she prayed; but, unfolding in the clear, 
keen cold New England clime, and nurtured in its abstract and positive 
theologies, her religious faculties took other forms. Instead of lying 
entranced in mysterious raptures at the foot of altars, she read and pon-
dered treatises on the Will, and listened in rapt attention, while her spiritu-
al guide, the venerated Dr. Hopkins, unfolded to her the theories of the 
great Edwards on the nature of true virtue. Womanlike, she felt the subtle 
poetry of these sublime abstractions which dealt with such infinite and 
unknown quantities,-which spoke of the universe, of its great Architect, 
of man, of angel, as matters of intimate and daily contemplation .... " (539£.) 
Stowe then comments as follows: lilt is not in our line to imply the truth or 
the falsehood of those systems of philosophic theology which seem for 
ffiilly years to have been the principal outlet for the proclivities of the New 
England mind, but as psychological developments they have an intense 
interest. He who does not see a grand side to these strivings of the soul 
cannot understand one of the noblest capabilities of humanity. No real 
artist or philosopher ever lived who has not at some hours risen to the 
height of utter self-abnegation for the glory of the invisible. There have 
been painters who would have been crucified to demonstrate the action of 
a muscle,-chemists who would gladly have melted themselves and all 
humanity in their crucible, if so a new discovery might arise out of its 
fumes. Even persons of mere artistic sensibility are at times raised by 
music, painting, or poetry to a momentary trance of self-oblivion, in which 
they would offer their whole being before the shrine of an invisible loveli-
ness. These hard old New England divines were the poets of metaphysical 
philosophy, who built systems in an artistic fervor, and felt self exhale 
from beneath them as they rose into the higher regions of thought." (541) 
Or consider this brief exchange between Deacon Twitchell and Dr. 
Hopkins: '''Well,' said Deacon Twitchell, 'Brother Seth ... says you deny 
depravity. He's all for imputation of Adam's sin, you know; and I have 
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long talks with Seth about it, every time he comes to see me; and he says 
that, if we did not sin in Adam, its given' up the whole ground altogeth-
er ... J wish Seth could talk with you sometime, Doctor. Along in the 
spring, he was down helpin' me to lay stone fence,-it was when we was 
fencin' off the south-pastur' lot,-and we talked pretty nigh all day; and 
the longer we talked, the sotter Seth grew. He's a master hand at readin'; 
and when he heard that your remarks on Dr. Mayhew had come out, Seth 
tackled up 0' purpose and come up to Newport to get them, and spent all 
his time, last winter, studyn' on it and makin' his remarks; and I tell you, 
Sir, he's a tight fellow to argue with. Why, that day, what with layin' stone 
wall and what with arguin' with Seth, ][ come home quite beat ouL .. '" (565) 
A great deal of evidence supports the general accuracy of Stowe's pic-
ture. New England sermons were typically "sequentially written and 
closely reasoned," and parishioners would sometimes take notes while 
they were being preached to refer to later.lO The Reverend Convers 
Francis--transcendentalist and professor at Harvard--said of Dr. 
Osgood, pastor at Medford: " ... though [his sermons] contained a consider-
able share of learned criticism, I remember my father, a mechanic and with 
but a slender education, was always delighted with them and used to talk 
about them after meeting .... "11 Something of the flavor of New England 
piety is indicated by the fact that the missionary to the Algonquin, John 
Eliot, translated a treatise on logic into that language "to initiate the 
Indians in the knowledge of the Rule of Reason," and in that way help 
them read their bibles properly.12 
The upshot is that precise argumentation and abstruse journeys into 
philosophical theology are an essential feature of some forms of authentic 
religiosity. But note that for arguments to play the roles assigned to them 
in this context, they must be sound. Bad arguments won't persuade intel-
lectually sophisticated nonbelievers. Arguments designed to establish 
common ground fail if those to whom they are addressed reject their 
premises or doubt their validity. Although Anselm's ontological argument 
for God's existence is developed in a devotional context, his reply to 
Gaunilo makes it clear that he thought that even unbelievers should recog-
nize its soundness. Nor will bad arguments help Anselm achieve his inter-
related goals of contemplating God- "seeing His face," and understand-
ing what he had formerly only believed. Finally, offering God a bad argu-
ment is like offering Him a blemished lamb; it dishonors Him. (Cf. Malachi 
3.) In short, contextualizing arguments by situating them in the lives of the 
people who employ them and the persons to whom they are addressed in 
no way absolves their makers or recipients from the responsibility of 
assessing their validity, the truth of their premises, and their probative 
force. Theistic arguments will serve the purposes for which they are 
designed only if they are good arguments. 
II 
But are they? On the face of it, it seems that they aren't. The fate of the-
istic arguments in the modem period is instructive. Philosophical theology 
flourished in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. One thinks of 
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the Boyle lectures, for example, or the work of Samuel Clarke, or 
Malebranche, or Leibniz. Yet by the end of the eighteenth century, theistic 
arguments had lost much of their power to persuade, and those who (like 
Schleiermacher and Coleridge) wished to commend religion to its "cul-
tured despisers" cast about for new approaches. The devaluation of theis-
tic arguments was partly due to bad philosophy. (Hume's and Kant's cri-
tique of the traditional proofs, for instance, isn't clearly cogent.) It was also 
partly due to a Zeitgeist which overvalued sentiment and feeling, and 
undervalued close analytic reasoning. But whatever the causes, the fact is 
that theistic proofs lost much of their power to produce firm conviction in 
educated audiences. Unless I am very much mistaken, what was true by 
the end of the eighteenth century remains true today. 
More troubling is the fact that theistic arguments fail to persuade many 
whom one would think would be persuaded if the arguments were proba-
tive. Let me cite a personal example which is, I think, typical. William 
Rowe and I are both analytic philosophers of religion, and were both 
trained at the University of Michigan in the late 1950's by the same teach-
ers. We do philosophy in the same way, and have collaborated, corre-
sponded, and exchanged ideas for the past thirty five years. Yet I think 
Samuel Clarke's cosmological argument for God's existence is sound and 
Rowe does not. Conversely, Rowe thinks that the evidential argument 
from evil provides a more or less conclusive reason for denying that God 
exists and I do not. What accounts for our disagreement? Not differences 
in training, information, or intelligence nor, I dare say, in intellectual fair 
mindedness or moral sensitivity. 
So what does account for disagreements like these?13 In part, at least, 
biography. As William James noted, we approach issues with different 
personal histories, temperaments, commitments, and passions. As a conse-
quence, equally intelligent and well-intentioned inquirers can evaluate the 
same body of evidence in radically different ways. James thought that, 
ultimately, our visions of the world are "accidents, more or less of personal 
vision." For they express "our temperament"-"our individual way of 
just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos." Belief in 
metaphysical hypotheses like determinism or indeterminism, supernatu-
ralism or naturalism, or idealism or materialism is partly an expression of 
what James called our "willing" or "passional" nature-our temperament, 
needs, concerns, hopes, fears, passions, and deepest intuitions. Minds like 
Spinoza's, for example, have a "passion for simplification" whereas minds 
like Hume's have a "passion for distinguishing." The "tough-minded" 
find materialism compelling while the "tender minded" do not. A meta-
phYSical pluralism and indeterminism that emphasizes the openness of the 
future and human moral capacity is an expression of days in which we are 
"in the full and successful exercise of our moral energy," and "the life we 
feel tingling through us vouches sufficiently for itself." A deterministic 
monism, on the other hand, is rooted in days when we are "all J sicklied 
a' er' with the sense of weakness, of helplessness, failure, and of fear."14 
Or consider another example. John Henry Newman distinguishes 
"real" and "notional" apprehension. Notional apprehension regards the 
terms of the propositions it considers as counters to be manipulated. Real 
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apprehension cashes the terms out in appropriate mental images and asso-
ciations. Real apprehension is, as H. H. Price says, "thingish and imagina-
tive."lS The importance of this is that one's assent to the force of an argu-
ment may depend on whether one's apprehension of its premises is real or 
notional. For example, the argument from evil won't unduly trouble those 
whose apprehension of "Evil exists" is largely notional, for they don't 
appreciate evil's horror. Cosmological arguments for God's existence are 
unlikely to impress people who aren't struck by the fact that the world 
exists when it might not have, or who lack a vivid sense of how odd it 
would be if a contingent being had no causes at all, and whose apprehen-
sion of the propositions "The world exists" and "Every contingent being 
has a cause" is thus merely notional. All of this creates a problem, howev-
er, for (as Newman points out) real apprehen.<;ion depends on images and 
associations, and these depend on personal experience. Yet "the experi-
ence of one man is not the experience of another."16 As a result, real appre-
hensions, and hence assessments of the force of theistic and anti-theistic argu-
ments, will vary radically from one person to another. 
III 
The facts I have called attention to in section II are, I think, obvious. But 
the conclusions to be drawn from them are not. My concern in Reason and 
the Heart was a response to the phenomenon of basic disagreements which 
surfaces from time to time in the Christian tradition-that one's ability to 
adequately evaluate the force of a body of evidence can be a function of the 
state of one's heart. This response was once a Christian commonplace; rea-
son is capable of knowing God on the basis of evidence--but only when 
one's cognitive faculties are rightly disposed. It should be distinguished 
from two others that have dominated modem thought. The first claims 
that God can be known by "objective reason," i.e., by an understanding 
that systematically excludes passion, desire, and emotion from the process 
of reasoning. The other insists that God can only be known subjectively or 
by the heart. Both views identify reason with ratiocination or mental cal-
culation. Both also assume that reasoning is objective only when it is unaf-
fected by wants, interests, and desires. The tradition I discuss steers 
between these two extremes. It places a high value on proofs, arguments, 
and inferences yet also believes that a properly disposed heart is needed to 
see their force. This epistemic theory is deeply embedded in important 
strands of the Christian tradition. Calvin, for example, thought that ratio-
nal arguments for the authority of scripture "will not obtain full credit in 
the hearts of men until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the spir-
it."17 And while Aquinas believed that there is good evidence for the 
divine origin of Christian teaching, he didn't think that it was sufficient to 
compel assent in the absence of the inward movement of a will grounded 
in a "supernatural principle," namely, "God who moves us inwardly 
through grace."IS Similarly, seventeenth century Anglican divines argued 
that "the gospel can only obtain' a free admission into the assent of the 
understanding when it brings a passport from a rightly disposed will' ."19 
The notion that a proper disposition is needed to appreciate the force of 
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rational arguments for the authority of the gospel can be easily extended to 
rational arguments for the truths of "natural religion" when these, too, 
come under attack. John Spurr has argued that this process was well 
underway by the end of the seventeenth century. A recognition of the 
importance of the right moral and spiritual dispositions for philosophical 
inquiry into God's being and nature was already implicit in Christian prac-
tice, however. For example, Anselm interweaves his argumentation in the 
Proslogion with prayers to arouse his emotions and stir his will because he 
assumes that emotional and volitional discipline is as necessary for the suc-
cess of his enterprise as intellectual discipline. The first two thirds of 
Reason and the Heart explored this theme in three figures--Jonathan 
Edwards, John Henry Newman, and William James. 
Jonathan Edwards, for example, argued that the possession of "true 
benevolence" or "the love of being in general" is a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition of properly evaluating arguments for God's existence, 
his providential government of human affairs, and the like. 
Edwards' view is briefly this. "Actual ideas" are ideas that are lively, 
dear, and distinct. Thought has a tendency to substitute "signs" (words, 
images) for actual ideas. This tendency is useful and normally quite harm-
less. But it impedes reasoning when "we are at a loss concerning a connec-
tion or consequence [between ideas], or have a new inference to draw, or 
would see the force of some new argument."20 Now if accurate reasoning 
about a subject matter involves attending to actual ideas of it, then one 
can't accurately reason about religion if one lacks the appropriate actual 
ideas. To have an actual idea of God, for example, one must have actual 
ideas of the ideas that compose it. But most of us do not. Those parts of 
trle idea of God that everyone has (ideas of power, knowledge, and justice, 
for instance) either aren't attended to or, when they are, fail to elicit the 
proper affective reactions. Other parts of the idea of God are simply miss-
ing. Without the simple idea of "true beauty" (the radiance or splendor of 
holiness) we can't understand God's holiness and the facts that depend on 
it such as the infinite heinousness of sin (and, hence, the necessity of the 
atonement). And because we can't properly understand ideas of affections 
if we haven't experienced them, we can't understand God's benevolence if 
we aren't benevolent ourselves. True benevolence remedies each of these 
deficiencies. Because the desires of the truly benevolent are properly 
ordered, they are suitably affected by the ideas of God's attributes and 
activities which everyone has. (They fear his wrath, for example, and are 
grateful for his benefits.) They also understand God's benevolence since 
their own benevolence mirrors it. Finally, the truly benevolent delight in 
the benevolence in which holiness consists, that is, they "perceive" or 
"taste" or "relish" its beauty. Edwards' claim, then, is that to reason accu-
rately about God one must possess an actual idea of God, and to have that 
one must be truly benevolent. Right reasoning about religious matters 
requires right affections. 
James' account of "passional reason" isn't tied to Christian theology. The 
aim of epistemic rationality is to increase our stock of significant truths, and 
James never disputes this. But, in his opinion, the tendencies "in one's emo-
tionallife can be prophetic." Our passional nature includes "concrete per-
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ceptions" and "insight giving passions," "instincts" and "divinations,"2! and 
these can be reliable indications of "theoretic" (objective) truth.22 
Is this plausible? It is if we can assume some sort of congruence 
between the mind's structure and the structure of reality. And James does. 
Our faculties and powers have evolved as they have because they are 
adaptive. The best, or most natural, explanation of the fact that these facul-
ties and powers are adaptive is that the beliefs they produce when proper-
ly used "correspond" (in a rough and ready way) to the way things are. 
Nor are positions like these confined to theists. For consider the follow-
ing example from the iconoclastic Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming: "The 
Iiangzhi is the innate ... faculty that enables one to know the Ii ( ... principle) of 
the mind and universe ... All things possess all the Ii of the universe within 
them," and, for Wang, "the mind is itself Ii: 'knowing is the conscious 
aspect of Ii.'" The liangzhi, or "complete and perfect mind," enables one to 
distinguish "naturally and spontaneously between right and wrong," and 
everyone possesses iU3 
What then explains our bad choices? The obstructions of qi ("material 
force" or "lively matter") which Wang primarily identifies with self-cen-
tered desires.24 The most important point in the present context, however, 
is this: the Iiangzhi is at once a cognitive and an affective faculty. To truly 
know something, the mind must therefore be in the proper affective state. 
And, for Wan~ the proper state is "the affective state of selflessness." 
Without this "one's mere true belief" cannot be transformed "into what 
[he] calls 'real knowledge (zhenzhi)' or simply knowledge (zhi)." To accom-
plish this one must engage in the "rectification of thoughts" (gewu) and 
"the extension of knowledge" (zhizhi). One rectifies one's thoughts by 
attending to and eliminating one's self-centered thoughts, and one extends 
one's knowledge by engaging in the appropriate practical activity. (For 
example, one extends one's 'knowledge' [I.e., true belief] of one's filial duty 
by lovingly caring for one's parents.) The bottom line in all this is that the 
right affections are a necessary condition of right knowledge. 
It is important to appreciate how radical views like these are. Since the 
rise of modernity, the standard Western view has been that the effect of pas-
sion on reasoning is inimical; emotion, interest, and commitment distort 
inquiry by blinding us to the force of counter evidence and weakening our 
commitment to rational standards. To be rational one must be objective, and 
to be objective one must be dispassionate. Theologians and philosophers 
such as Edwards, James, and Wang oppose this view, contending that the 
effect of passion on reason is sometimes epistemically beneficial. 
Positions like these are open to objections of subjectivism, circularity, 
and relativism. I will comment briefly on the first.25 The objection is this. 
Allowing passion and feeling to influence our judgment opens the door to 
bias, distortion, and wishful thinking. Beliefs are made true by the states of 
affairs they represent. The concept of a true belief involves "the thought of 
a causal chain stretching back from the belief" to the state of affairs which 
makes it true. Passional believing, like wishful thinkin~ severs this con-
nection. Once we learn that our beliefs are caused by passion and feeling, 
and not by the states of affairs they represent, we can no longer regard 
them as true.26 
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This objection rests on a misunderstanding. Views like Edwards' or 
Newman's or James' or Wang's do not deny that beliefs are made true by 
the states of affairs they represent. Nor do they deny that justified true 
beliefs are causally connected to the states of affairs that make them true. 
On the contrary, the passions they privilege are believed to be correlated 
with the way things actually are. These passions are reflections of reality, 
causal products of the states of affairs represented by the beliefs they gen-
erate. James, for example, thinks that our "willing nature" has evolved as 
it has because following its dictates has enabled us to more successfully 
adjust to reality. Behavior based on our passional nature27 wouldn't be so 
successful if it led us to egregiously misrepresent things as they are. 
Similarly, Edwards attempts to show that the "mechanism" underlying 
our renewed epistemic faculties, namely, true benevolence, "agrees" with 
reality. Reality's core is an infinite benevolence--the world's only true 
s·llbstance and its only true cause. The benevolence of the saints is ground-
ed in this and mirrors it. Edwards concludes that benevolence isn't "arbi-
trary" but agrees "with the necessary nature of things."28 Again, if Wang's 
Neo-Confucian conception of ultimate reality as li is true, and if his identi-
fication of our minds in their own nature with 1 i is correct, then the beliefs 
that have been generated by a mind that has been purified of the obstruc-
tions of qi are probably true and probably warranted. Because charges of 
wishful thinkjng, rampant subjectivism, and so on, presuppose that links 
of this kjnd don't exist, they beg the question against views of this type. 
The view that I am articulating is not as outlandish as might at first 
appear. That certain dispositions and attitudes are needed to reason rightly 
in moral matters is a commonplace in both classical Chinese and classical 
western moral philosophy. I have already alluded to Wang's views. As for 
the west, Plato thought that "neither quickness of learning nor a good mem-
ory can make a man see when his nature is not alQn to the object...no man 
who is not naturally inclined and alQn to justice and all other forms of excel-
lence, even though he be quick at learning and remembering this or 
that...will ever attain the truth that is available about virtue."29 And 
Aristotle believed that the first premises of moral reasoning are general 
propositions about what is good for people in general, or for certain kinds 
of people, or for people in certain circumstances. General propositions of 
this sort are partial articulations of the good life. Men and women whose 
natures have been warped by training or circumstance will have a pervert-
ed sense of the good (identifying it with the life of pleasure, say, or the life 
of worldly honor). These people (as Plato says) have a "lie in their soul," 
arId so are incapable of reasoning correctly about moral matters. A proper-
ly cultivated emotional nature is thus essential to sound ethical reasoning. 
Now classical Christian theism identified God with Goodness itself. If 
this identification is correct, it is not surprising that the proper dispositions 
and feelings should be thought necessary to perceive Him. 
The relevance of my remarks about ethics is more general than my appli-
cation of them to Christian theism might suggest, however. The most obvi-
ous instances of the thesis that basic disputes reflect different passionally 
inflected assessments of the same body of evidence is furnished by conflicts 
over comprehensive world-views. Some of these world-views are religious. 
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But many are not. It is at least arguable, however, that all comprehensive 
world-views integrally incorporate values. If they do, and values can't be 
grasped in the absence of the right feelings and emotions, then appropriate 
dispositions of the heart will be needed to discern the truth of a world-view. 
If this is correct, then reflective adherents of any world-view may be forced 
to adopt epistemic positions similar to those I find in Wang Yangming, and 
in Edwards and much of the Christian tradition, and in William James. It 
will ultimately prove impossible to defend the rationality of one's basic 
intellectual commitments without at least implicitly assuming that some pas-
sions, emotions, and feelings are epistemically beneficial. 
If the views discussed in this section are on the right track, however, 
then western philosophy, at least, must rethink its relation to rhetoric. To 
that I now tum. 
IV 
An important strand in western philosophy drives a wedge between 
rational discourse and persuasion. Rational discourse is the domain of phi-
losophy. Persuasion, however, is the domain of rhetoric, and rhetoric is 
epistemically and morally suspect. Thus, Plato argues that it isn't a species 
of knowledge but, rather, a mere "knack" or "technique" (empeiria). The 
rhetorician has mastered the devices and stratagems which enable him to 
speak persuasively but lacks a theoretical understanding of their nature, of 
the psychological and social mechanisms which ensure that some tech-
niques will be effective and others not. Furthermore, the rhetorician's aim 
is not to produce knowledge or true opinion but to convince his audience 
of the truth of his assertions whether they are in fact true or not. And 
because rhetoric's aim is persuasion, its mastery involves a command of 
those devices which make speakers persuasive. These include sound argu-
ments. But they also include plausible but specious proofs, ad hominem 
attacks, appeals to one's hearers' baser emotions and prejudices, the cre-
ation of a favorable personal impression whether it is warranted or not, 
verbal style and ornament, and so on.30 The rhetorician's means of persua-
sion are thus both rational and non-rational. And this is morally problem-
atic. Genuine arts aim at the good of their subject matter. The aim of medi-
cine, for example, is to produce health. By contrast, rhetoric is not con-
cerned with the spiritual and moral well being of its potential audiences 
but only with persuasion. The rhetorician qua rhetorician is indifferent to 
whether he produces knowledge or true opinion, on the one hand, or false 
opinion, on the other, and to whether he persuades us by employing rea-
son and appealing to our nobler sentiments or convinces us by using spe-
cious arguments and pandering to our worse desires. The philosopher wish-
es to benefit the souls of her hearers and so employs rational means to pro-
duce knowledge or true belief. The rhetorician as such is not concerned 
with what would benefit us. 
But, of course, matters aren't so simple. Plato himself concedes (in the 
Phaedrus) that the first defect could be remedied. The second cannot. But 
the force of this admission is mitigated by four things. First, Plato himself 
is a master of rhetoric as he must surely have recognized. Second, while 
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techniques don't aim at the good (as arts do), they can be used for people's 
benefit. The gourmet chef, for example, can make nutritious food tasty. 
Third, there is a place for a chastened rhetoric in Plato's ideal community. 
The use of "noble lies" is a notorious example. More important, children 
are surrounded from infancy by "beautiful forms" (objects, practices, and 
words) in an attempt to induce harmony and order in both their bodies and 
souls. Finally, Plato's mature account of moral failure explains why 
rhetoric is still needed. Moral failure is rooted in either of two causes. The 
first is reason's failure to discern the good. The second is a failure in the 
lower parts of the soul which prevents them from concurring in reason's 
judgment (sensuality or avarice, for example, which are failures of 
appetite, or cowardice or arrogance which are failures of spirit [thymosD. 
The function of rhetoric in the ideal state is to induce "friendship" (Plato's 
term) or psychic harmony in the soul, so that appetite and thymos willing-
ly concur in the judgment of reason. So there is a place for rhetoric, after 
all, but only when directed by philosophy.31 
Or consider Augustine. Rhetoric is useful when properly deployed. 
IiWhile the faculty of eloquence .. .is of great value in urging either evil or 
injustice, [it] is itself indifferent." Why, then, "should it not be obtained for 
the uses of the good in the service of truth if the evil usurp it...in defense of 
iniquity and error?" And indeed, in certain contexts and for certain pur-
poses, rhetoric is indispensable. "If those who hear are to be taught," clear 
and careful exposition is needed, and "in order that those things that are 
doubtful may be made certain they must be reasoned out with the use of 
evidence. But if" one's hearers "are to be moved rather than taught, so that 
they may not be sluggish in putting what they know into practice and so 
that they may fully accept those things which they acknowledge to be true, 
there is need for greater powers of speaking. Here entreaties and reproofs, 
exhortations and rebukes, and whatever other [rhetorical] devices are nec-
essary to move minds must be used."32 
Following Cicero, Augustine asserts that "he who is eloquent should 
speak in such a way that he teaches, delights, and moves." The first 
"resides in the things which we have to say, the other two in the manner in 
which we say iLJust as the listener is to be delighted if he is to be retained 
as a listener, so also is he to be persuaded if he is to be moved to act." Even 
so, "instruction should [not only] come before persuasion" but may make 
persuasion unnecessary if one's hearers are "so moved by a knowledge" of 
things necessary "that it is not necessary to move them further by greater 
powers of eloquence." If, however, they are "taught and pleased and still 
[don't] consent," persuasion is needed. For "what use are" teaching and 
delight if consent "does not follow. But delight is not necessary either."33 
The upshot of all this is that while teaching is always necessary, persua-
sion is necessary only when teaching itself doesn't lead to action, and 
delight (being pleased with the speaker's manner of presentation) is of 
value only when needed to hold the hearer's attention and make him more 
receptive to the teaching of the speaker. The implication is that rhetoric has 
ancillary value only; it is subordinate to "teaching" (wisdom, or Christian 
philosophy) and should be directed by it. 
This theme reechoes throughout the history of western philosophy. 
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Hobbes's and Locke's animadversions on metaphor and rhetoric are exam-
ples. Thus Hobbes thinks that one of language's most important functions 
is to communicate knowledge, and that this function is impeded whenever 
we "use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than they are 
ordained for; and thereby deceive others."34 "Metaphors, tropes, and other 
rhetorical figures" can be used to decorate discourse or "in common 
speech, ... yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be 
admitted."~5 Or as Locke says, "All the art of rhetoric, besides order and 
clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence 
hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect 
cheats: and therefore ... they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to 
inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided ... .!t is evident how much men love 
to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of 
error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has 
always been had in great reputation."36 
A less familiar, and potentially more interesting example for the 
philosopher of religion, is provided by the Puritans' attitude towards 
rhetoric. John Penry insisted that "the lord doth not ordinarily bestowe 
[full comprehension of the Word] upon any in our days, without the 
knowledge of the artes, especially the two handmaydes of all learninge, 
Rhetoricke and Logick. ... "" Rhetoric "was the means by which the logical 
analysis of the Word was brought home to the congregation to spur repen-
tance and conversion."3B Indeed, "where there is one injunction to 
expound the will of God 'out of soundnesse of argument and plaine evi-
dence' ... there are a hundred that exclaim in more passionate accents '0 
brethren let the fire burn clear; let there not be more smoke than fire'." "It 
is not enough," said Thomas Hooker, lithat we be stirring in the house and 
people be up, but we must knock at men's doors, bring a candle to their 
bedsides, and pinch the sluggard, and lhen if he have any life he will stir."39 
But heat without light is equally undesirable. "The ministers of the 
gospel" are to "apply themselves ... to Rational Men, who are to be led, not 
driven; who follow the conduct of Reason rather than force."40 Thus, 
Jonathan Edwards says, "When light imd heat are ... united in a minister of 
the gospel, it shows that each is genuine ... .Divine light is attended with 
heat; and so, on the other hand, a truly divine and holy heat and ardour is 
ever accompanied with light."4! It is true that, in their reflections on the 
sermon, Puritan divines emphasized "application," and hence rhetoric. 
For as Edwards also asserts, "Though ... clearness of distinction and illustra-
tion and strength of reason, and a good method, in the doctrinal handling 
of the truths of religion is in many ways needful and profitable, and not to 
be neglected ... our people don't so much need to have their heads stored, as 
their hearts touched."42 Nevertheless, it is clearly assumed that the minis-
ter's use of rhetoric will be guided by his grasp of the truths of sacred sci-
ence. The Puritan divines share Plato's view that, however necessary, 
rhetoric is a mere handmaid of right reason (philosophy, sacred science). 
Until recently, at least, this view has dominated the west. 
But a closer look reveals internal tensions. Arguably, philosophical 
debates are structured on a forensic model.43 In the Platonic dialogues, 
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opinions are broached and subjected to philosophical scrutiny in the hope 
that the truth will emerge through a process of questioning and answering. 
The medieval practice of examining philosophical and theolOgical theses in 
public debates is reflected in the structure of Aquinas's Summa Thcologiae. 
Modem philosophers proceed in the same fashion. Someone advances a 
thesis, offers arguments for it, and then responds to the criticism of other 
philosophers. The thesis that best survives criticism is then regarded as the 
closest approximation to the truth currently available. It may therefore be 
significant that the medieval disputatio in which "a specific problem [was] 
put to the speaker in the form of a question to which he had to formulate a 
satisfactory answer" bears a "strong resemblance ... to the declamationes of the 
Roman oratory schools. When rhetoric disappeared from public life at the 
end of the Republic ... and became a matter for the school, similar tasks were 
given to the pupils. Suetonius provides us with the following example." A 
group of young men and some fishermen agree that, for a fixed price, the 
fishermen will let the young men have their catch. They haul in their nets 
and, wrule there are no fish, there is a basket of gold. "'The buyers claimed 
that the catch belonged to them, while the fishermen said that the basket of 
gold was theirs.' The pupils had then to deliver a well-constructed speech 
to defend one of the two positions.".J.l It may also be significant that the 
medieval disputatio is modeled on a judicial procedure and that, in the 
cmcient world, rhetoric was principally prized as a tool for persuading oth-
ers of the truth of one's assertions in the assembly and law courts. Rhetoric 
was highly valued, in other words, as the most effective means to power. 
But what precisely follows from the fact that philosophical discussion 
follows a forensic model? Not that rational discourse and philosophical 
argumentation are no more than disguised expressions of the speaker's 
will to power (as Nietzche and Foucault claim) but, rather, that, because 
the lines between them are less sharp than has been traditionally sup-
posed, philosophy shouldn't be too quick to dismiss rhetoric.45 
I have already alluded to Plato's masterly deployment of rhetoric to 
defend philosophy's hegemony. I have also called attention to the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century Puritan and Anglican divines' insistence 
that both the gospel and arguments of natural theology can only obtain" a 
free admission into the assent of the understanding when [they] bring a 
passport from a rightly disposed will." We have seen that Plato, too, 
thought that "neither quickness of learning nor a good memory can make 
a man see [the Good] when his nature is not akin to the object." In his 
view, reason has its own loves and desires46 which must be carefully nur-
hIred if it is to function as it ought. And Augustine, as well, says some-
thing similar. Reason should not be discarded once faith has been 
achieved. For "God forbid that He should hate in us that faculty [reason] 
by which He has made us superior to all other living beings. Therefore, we 
must refuse so to believe as not to seek a reason for our beliefs." 
Nevertheless, faith (with its appropriate motions of the heart) is a precondition 
of the success of this enterprise. For some things must first be believed to 
be understood. "Therefore the prophet said with reason: 'if you will not 
believe, you will not understand."'47 
Plato's and Augustine's official view is that even when properly 
404 Faith and Philosophy 
employed, rhetorical persuasion is second best, a mere substitute for ratio-
nal persuasion. I have argued, however, that, in their own view, certain 
affective and conative states are needed to achieve knowledge. If this is 
correct, then rhetoric isn't a more or less dispensable tool which reason 
employs to induce acceptance of its dictates; a properly deployed rhetoric 
must, instead, be part of rational discourse. Rational persuasion includes 
rhetorical persuasion., the arousal of the passions, desires, and emotional 
states needed for the sort of knowledge in question-a love of justice in 
the case of ethical knowledge, perhaps, or (if Jonathan Edwards or Pascal 
are right) "true benevolence" or a hunger for God in the case of natural 
theology, or (if Wang is right) selflessness.48 
But precisely how should rhetorical tools be employed in philosophy 
(rational discourse)? In the same way we use them to inculcate such stan-
dard intellectual virtues as fair mindedness, honesty in the handling of evi-
dence, openness to criticism, or the elimination of "unjust" prejudice or 
bias:9 The practice of philosophy involves cherishing, exemplifying, and 
advocating values like these. Commitment to them is intrinsic, not 
extrinsic, to it. Teaching philosophy involves inducting students into a 
rational practice that involves possessing and exercising these intellectual 
virtues; their acquisition is part of what is involved in becoming a good rea-
soner. Yet If I am correct about the role our passional nature plays in good 
reasoning about religious matters and, more generally, in good reasoning 
about any value saturated subject matter,"o then the same is true of certain 
virtues of the heart-true benevolence, for example, or a love of God, or 
human-heartedness, or (if the Buddhists are right) wisdom and compas-
sion. In my view, example, praise and dispraise, imaginative and emotion-
al appeals5f-rhetoric, in short-play an essential role in the practice of 
philosophy because they are needed to inculcate and reinforce the intellec-
tual, ethical, and spiritual values which infuse good reasoning.52 53 
v 
In concluding I want to consider three objections to the claim that the 
deployment of rhetoric is intrinsically bound up with good philosophical 
reasoning about religious matters. The first two purport to demonstrate 
that philosophy and rhetoric are essentially opposed. The third attempts 
to show that even if some uses of rhetoric are inseparable from the practice 
of philosophy, appeals to our passional nature should play no part in it. 
(1) Kant thinks that poetry is an expression of our freedom, of the 
pure play of the imagination. But poetry "plays with illusion," it does not 
use "illusion to deceive us .. .it does not seek to sneak up on the understand-
ing and ensnare it by a sensible exhlbition."54 Rhetoric or the art of persua-
sion, on the other hand, "is a violent threat" to its audience's autonomy, 
depriving its hearers of their "freedom to think, decide and judge for" 
themselves.55 Rhetoric "move[s] people like machines to a judgment that 
must lose all its weight with them when they meditate about it 
calmly ... oratory ... , the art of using people's weaknesses for one's own aims 
(no matter how good these may be in intention or even in fact), is unwor-
thy of any respect whatsoever."56 For "the motto of enlightenment" is 
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"have courage to use your own reason!"57 By substituting her own judg-
ment for ours, the successful orator keeps us in "tutelage," and thereby 
prevents us from achieving our full humanity. 
But Kant's polemic is successful only if (a) what we most essentially are 
is pure reason, and (b) the emotions, feelings, and passions as such play no 
role in good reasoning. If these presuppositions are correct, then appeals 
to our emotions, feelings, and "prejudices"58 are attacks on our autonomy. 
Yet both claims are suspect. Our subjectivity (Kierkegaard) or passional 
nature Games) helps define who we are; it is as much a constituent of our 
being as is our reason. The second presupposition is equally dubious. If 
the epistemological position I am defending is correct, our emotions, pas-
sions, and feelings play an essential role in good reasoning about value 
laden subject matters.59 
(2) Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. also thinks that rhetoric and philosophy 
are essentially opposed. The devices of the rhetorician are effective only 
when they are concealed from his audience since "it is impossible to be 
persuaded by a technical device [of rhetoric] at the same time that one sees 
it as merely a device." By contrast, not only are the "devices" (namely, 
rational arguments) of the philosopher transparent to those to whom they 
are addressed, their endorsement by the latter is essential to securing the 
kind of agreement he aims at (namely, rational agreement). Moreover, the 
very enterprise in which the philosopher is engaged includes making his 
"tools" available to his audience to criticize his own assertions. 
Another difference between the philosopher and the rhetorician is that 
the latter needn't share the beliefs, attitudes, or prejudices to which he 
appeals to be effective nor privately endorse the views he is advocating. 
Yet this would be totally inappropriate for the philosopher. Because phi-
llosophy is a search for truth, the philosopher undercuts her enterprise if 
she employs premises she regards as false or dubious, or attempts to per-
suade her audience of the truth of opinions she believes to be false."o 
What Johnstone has shown at best, however, is that philosophy and a 
certain kind of rhetoric are opposed. He has not shown that the sort of 
rhetorical appeal I am defending can't playa legitimate role in philosophi-
cal argumentation. Note first that the rhetorician's devices don't always 
lose their effectiveness when his audience becomes aware of them. 
Appeals to the audience's emotions, for example, don't lose their effective-
ness when the audience is convinced that the emotions the speaker is evok-
ing are relevant or appropriate. Sermons, or an impassioned discourse 
designed to arouse one's compassion for the less fortunate, are examples. 
In cases like these the hearer may be fully aware of what the speaker is 
doing and yet legitimately endorse and be moved by it because he rightly 
regards the emotions in question as epistemically relevant to the discern-
ment of spiritual or moral truth. Moreover, where both speaker and hearer 
agree that the emotion to which the speaker is appealing belongs to a class 
of emotions which are epistemically relevant, the hearer can appeal to 
other members of that class to criticize and/ or refine the speaker's own 
assertions. Nor does Johnstone's last point militate against the use of 
rhetoric I am advocating. For, in the cases, I am envisaging, the speaker 
shares and prizes the emotions and attitudes she appeals to or is attempt-
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ing to elicit, and endorses the conclusions she is advocating. (Cf. our 
attempts to elicit a commitment to the appropriate epistemic virtues in our 
philosophy students.) 
But the most important point is this. The underlying assumption of 
Plato's or Locke's or Kant's or Johnstone's dismissal of rhetoric is that 
appeals to emotion and "prejudice" are not just epistemically irrelevant but 
undermine the search for truth. If I am correct this assumption is false. 
When the emotions and "prejudices" in question are of the right sort they 
may be needed to discern it. 
(3) The third objection to my position is more serious, however. Even 
if there are accidental connections between particular cultures or historical 
periods and good reasoning,61 the connection isn't essential. Similarly, if 
the universalist pretensions of the world religions are legitimate, then nei-
ther the acceptance of their claims nor the experiences of conversion or 
enlightenment they foster should be dependent upon the adoption of a 
particular culture. Now, if I am right, our passional nature plays a role in 
good reasoning. Our passional nature is shaped by our personal histories, 
however, and these, in turn, by our culhue. The following example is illus-
trative. William James appeals to hopes and fears, interests and senti-
ments, which he believes are universal and, in particular, to humanity's 
alleged horror of meaninglessness and its need for significant action. Yet is 
the latter really universal? Or is the need for significant action, instead, 
rooted in western (and especially American) society as that took shape in 
the second half of the nineteenth century? Would a Buddhist or Taoist, for 
instance, acknowledge its power or (more significantly) agree that any sat-
isfactory world-view must satisfy it? Since the Buddhist believes that igno-
rance (avidya) and craving (trisna) are the source of suffering (duhkha), it is 
pretty clear that he, at least, would not. There is a tension, then, between 
classical ideals of rationality, and the world religions' universalist preten-
sions, on the one hand, and appeals to our passional nature, on the other. 
In so far as philosophy and philosophical theology share these ideals 
and make claims on universal assent, their use of rhetoric must be sensitive 
to the distinction between aspects of our passional nature that are cultural-
ly specific or personally idiosyncratic and those which aren't. If reason and 
truth truly are universal, then even if good reasoning in religion is passional 
reasoning, appeals to the culturally specific or personally idiosyncratic 
should at best play no more than an ancillary role in philosophical dis-
course. (It should be noted, however, that states of the heart can be cultur-
ally non-specific and non-idiosyncratic without being universal. Fairness 
to one's intellectual opponents, for example, may be rare but isn't essential-
ly tied to particular cultures.62) 
Whether the classical ideal of rationality is consistent with my account 
of the role of passion and rhetoric in reasoning and speaking about reli-
gious and other value laden topics may stand or fall on the outcome of a 
research project in comparative philosophy. This project involves three 
elements. First, an examination of Christian, say, or Buddhist theories of 
rhetoric as well as of logic, and Buddhist and Christian accounts of the 
relation between them. Second, an examination of Christian, say, or 
Buddhist rhetorical practices in contexts in which arguments are offered, 
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examined, and rebutted. And, third, an examination of the passions and 
virtues valued in Christian, say, or Buddhist inquiry, and the extent to 
which these passions and virtues are culturally or temperamentally specif-
ic. 
An investigation of Chinese philosophy may prove especially illuminat-
ing in the present connection since "rhetoric has always been an integral 
aspect of philosophizing in the Chinese tradition without it ever having 
been bifurcated off as a separate tradition."63 For example, in many 
Confucian texts, rhetorical appeals are seamlessly interwoven with struc-
tured argumentation and systematic reflection. Of course the latter can be 
abstracted from the former. The price of doing so, however, is to under-
mine the rational (and not merely emotional) force of the text.64 
I think that these investigations will reveal that rhetorical strategies are 
essentially connected with rational inquiry into religious and other value 
laden matters. I think that they will also show that while some of the pas-
sions and virtues intrinsically connected with practices of rational inquiry 
are essentially tied to specific world-views,'" they are not essentially bound 
to particular cultures such as ancient China or the western middle ages or 
medieval India,66 or to particular temperaments or psychological types. 
Whether I am right will largely depend on the outcome of this inquiry. 
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62. This may be doubted. Robin Horton ("Tradition and Modernity Revisited," 
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